Why did Yamamoto reprimand Nagumo after Pearl Harbor?
I am reading the book "Shattered Sword" and it states that Yamamoto "rebuked" Nagumo after Pearl Harbor. I thought Pearl Harbor was considered a great success? Anyone know why Yamamoto thought it necessary to reprimand Nagumo? TIA
world-war-two
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I am reading the book "Shattered Sword" and it states that Yamamoto "rebuked" Nagumo after Pearl Harbor. I thought Pearl Harbor was considered a great success? Anyone know why Yamamoto thought it necessary to reprimand Nagumo? TIA
world-war-two
New contributor
I believe this topic has been explored extensively if sometimes inarticulately at alternatehistory.com. I believe the general consensus there to have been lack of capacity to inflict strategic damage while preserving a force in being.
– Samuel Russell
1 hour ago
add a comment |
I am reading the book "Shattered Sword" and it states that Yamamoto "rebuked" Nagumo after Pearl Harbor. I thought Pearl Harbor was considered a great success? Anyone know why Yamamoto thought it necessary to reprimand Nagumo? TIA
world-war-two
New contributor
I am reading the book "Shattered Sword" and it states that Yamamoto "rebuked" Nagumo after Pearl Harbor. I thought Pearl Harbor was considered a great success? Anyone know why Yamamoto thought it necessary to reprimand Nagumo? TIA
world-war-two
world-war-two
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edited 10 hours ago
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asked 11 hours ago
kmccarty
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I believe this topic has been explored extensively if sometimes inarticulately at alternatehistory.com. I believe the general consensus there to have been lack of capacity to inflict strategic damage while preserving a force in being.
– Samuel Russell
1 hour ago
add a comment |
I believe this topic has been explored extensively if sometimes inarticulately at alternatehistory.com. I believe the general consensus there to have been lack of capacity to inflict strategic damage while preserving a force in being.
– Samuel Russell
1 hour ago
I believe this topic has been explored extensively if sometimes inarticulately at alternatehistory.com. I believe the general consensus there to have been lack of capacity to inflict strategic damage while preserving a force in being.
– Samuel Russell
1 hour ago
I believe this topic has been explored extensively if sometimes inarticulately at alternatehistory.com. I believe the general consensus there to have been lack of capacity to inflict strategic damage while preserving a force in being.
– Samuel Russell
1 hour ago
add a comment |
1 Answer
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Essentially for failing to carry out a third attack. Wikipedia (my emboldening):
In the end, five American battleships were sunk, three were damaged, and eleven other cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries were sunk or seriously damaged. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft, while 74 were damaged by anti-aircraft fire from the ground. The damaged aircraft were disproportionately dive and torpedo bombers, seriously impacting available firepower to exploit the first two waves' success, so the commander of the First Air Fleet, Naval Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, withdrew. Yamamoto later lamented Nagumo's failure to seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the US carriers, absent from the harbor, or further bombard various strategically important facilities on Oahu. Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers might be, and remaining on station while his forces cast about looking for them ran the risk of his own forces being found first and attacked while his aircraft were absent searching. In any case, insufficient daylight remained after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves for the carriers to launch and recover a third before dark, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity for him to loiter long. Much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight, but, in keeping with Japanese military tradition not to criticize the commander on the spot, he did not punish Nagumo for his withdrawal.
which suggests the criticism may have been somewhat unjust.
The "strategically important facilities" included fuel stocks:
Wikipedia:
he was later criticized for his failure to launch a third attack, which might have destroyed the fuel oil storage and repair facilities. This could have rendered the most important U.S. naval base in the Pacific useless, especially as the use of the submarine base and intelligence station at the installation were critical factors in Japan's defeat.
1
The attack started at about 8 AM and both waves were over by about 10 AM. Thus there was plenty of time to carry out a third wave. I have read that the Japanese pilots wanted a third wave because they had seen other targets (fuel storage tanks, drydocks, submarine pens, etc.) but that Nagumo refused because he felt he accomplished his primary mission (attack the batteships) and did not want to risk his fleet in case the US carriers showed up. This was typical behavior of Japanese officers during the war: sticking to their mission and not be willing to take any chances.
– Barry
5 hours ago
@Barry, on the other hand all that accomplishes is make WWII bloodier. December 7 was a total loss for the Japanese. Even if they neutralize Hawaii altogether they will be crushed by overwhelming power.
– Joshua
5 hours ago
add a comment |
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Essentially for failing to carry out a third attack. Wikipedia (my emboldening):
In the end, five American battleships were sunk, three were damaged, and eleven other cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries were sunk or seriously damaged. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft, while 74 were damaged by anti-aircraft fire from the ground. The damaged aircraft were disproportionately dive and torpedo bombers, seriously impacting available firepower to exploit the first two waves' success, so the commander of the First Air Fleet, Naval Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, withdrew. Yamamoto later lamented Nagumo's failure to seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the US carriers, absent from the harbor, or further bombard various strategically important facilities on Oahu. Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers might be, and remaining on station while his forces cast about looking for them ran the risk of his own forces being found first and attacked while his aircraft were absent searching. In any case, insufficient daylight remained after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves for the carriers to launch and recover a third before dark, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity for him to loiter long. Much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight, but, in keeping with Japanese military tradition not to criticize the commander on the spot, he did not punish Nagumo for his withdrawal.
which suggests the criticism may have been somewhat unjust.
The "strategically important facilities" included fuel stocks:
Wikipedia:
he was later criticized for his failure to launch a third attack, which might have destroyed the fuel oil storage and repair facilities. This could have rendered the most important U.S. naval base in the Pacific useless, especially as the use of the submarine base and intelligence station at the installation were critical factors in Japan's defeat.
1
The attack started at about 8 AM and both waves were over by about 10 AM. Thus there was plenty of time to carry out a third wave. I have read that the Japanese pilots wanted a third wave because they had seen other targets (fuel storage tanks, drydocks, submarine pens, etc.) but that Nagumo refused because he felt he accomplished his primary mission (attack the batteships) and did not want to risk his fleet in case the US carriers showed up. This was typical behavior of Japanese officers during the war: sticking to their mission and not be willing to take any chances.
– Barry
5 hours ago
@Barry, on the other hand all that accomplishes is make WWII bloodier. December 7 was a total loss for the Japanese. Even if they neutralize Hawaii altogether they will be crushed by overwhelming power.
– Joshua
5 hours ago
add a comment |
Essentially for failing to carry out a third attack. Wikipedia (my emboldening):
In the end, five American battleships were sunk, three were damaged, and eleven other cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries were sunk or seriously damaged. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft, while 74 were damaged by anti-aircraft fire from the ground. The damaged aircraft were disproportionately dive and torpedo bombers, seriously impacting available firepower to exploit the first two waves' success, so the commander of the First Air Fleet, Naval Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, withdrew. Yamamoto later lamented Nagumo's failure to seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the US carriers, absent from the harbor, or further bombard various strategically important facilities on Oahu. Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers might be, and remaining on station while his forces cast about looking for them ran the risk of his own forces being found first and attacked while his aircraft were absent searching. In any case, insufficient daylight remained after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves for the carriers to launch and recover a third before dark, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity for him to loiter long. Much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight, but, in keeping with Japanese military tradition not to criticize the commander on the spot, he did not punish Nagumo for his withdrawal.
which suggests the criticism may have been somewhat unjust.
The "strategically important facilities" included fuel stocks:
Wikipedia:
he was later criticized for his failure to launch a third attack, which might have destroyed the fuel oil storage and repair facilities. This could have rendered the most important U.S. naval base in the Pacific useless, especially as the use of the submarine base and intelligence station at the installation were critical factors in Japan's defeat.
1
The attack started at about 8 AM and both waves were over by about 10 AM. Thus there was plenty of time to carry out a third wave. I have read that the Japanese pilots wanted a third wave because they had seen other targets (fuel storage tanks, drydocks, submarine pens, etc.) but that Nagumo refused because he felt he accomplished his primary mission (attack the batteships) and did not want to risk his fleet in case the US carriers showed up. This was typical behavior of Japanese officers during the war: sticking to their mission and not be willing to take any chances.
– Barry
5 hours ago
@Barry, on the other hand all that accomplishes is make WWII bloodier. December 7 was a total loss for the Japanese. Even if they neutralize Hawaii altogether they will be crushed by overwhelming power.
– Joshua
5 hours ago
add a comment |
Essentially for failing to carry out a third attack. Wikipedia (my emboldening):
In the end, five American battleships were sunk, three were damaged, and eleven other cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries were sunk or seriously damaged. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft, while 74 were damaged by anti-aircraft fire from the ground. The damaged aircraft were disproportionately dive and torpedo bombers, seriously impacting available firepower to exploit the first two waves' success, so the commander of the First Air Fleet, Naval Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, withdrew. Yamamoto later lamented Nagumo's failure to seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the US carriers, absent from the harbor, or further bombard various strategically important facilities on Oahu. Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers might be, and remaining on station while his forces cast about looking for them ran the risk of his own forces being found first and attacked while his aircraft were absent searching. In any case, insufficient daylight remained after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves for the carriers to launch and recover a third before dark, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity for him to loiter long. Much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight, but, in keeping with Japanese military tradition not to criticize the commander on the spot, he did not punish Nagumo for his withdrawal.
which suggests the criticism may have been somewhat unjust.
The "strategically important facilities" included fuel stocks:
Wikipedia:
he was later criticized for his failure to launch a third attack, which might have destroyed the fuel oil storage and repair facilities. This could have rendered the most important U.S. naval base in the Pacific useless, especially as the use of the submarine base and intelligence station at the installation were critical factors in Japan's defeat.
Essentially for failing to carry out a third attack. Wikipedia (my emboldening):
In the end, five American battleships were sunk, three were damaged, and eleven other cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries were sunk or seriously damaged. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft, while 74 were damaged by anti-aircraft fire from the ground. The damaged aircraft were disproportionately dive and torpedo bombers, seriously impacting available firepower to exploit the first two waves' success, so the commander of the First Air Fleet, Naval Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, withdrew. Yamamoto later lamented Nagumo's failure to seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the US carriers, absent from the harbor, or further bombard various strategically important facilities on Oahu. Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers might be, and remaining on station while his forces cast about looking for them ran the risk of his own forces being found first and attacked while his aircraft were absent searching. In any case, insufficient daylight remained after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves for the carriers to launch and recover a third before dark, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity for him to loiter long. Much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight, but, in keeping with Japanese military tradition not to criticize the commander on the spot, he did not punish Nagumo for his withdrawal.
which suggests the criticism may have been somewhat unjust.
The "strategically important facilities" included fuel stocks:
Wikipedia:
he was later criticized for his failure to launch a third attack, which might have destroyed the fuel oil storage and repair facilities. This could have rendered the most important U.S. naval base in the Pacific useless, especially as the use of the submarine base and intelligence station at the installation were critical factors in Japan's defeat.
answered 10 hours ago
pnuts
23611
23611
1
The attack started at about 8 AM and both waves were over by about 10 AM. Thus there was plenty of time to carry out a third wave. I have read that the Japanese pilots wanted a third wave because they had seen other targets (fuel storage tanks, drydocks, submarine pens, etc.) but that Nagumo refused because he felt he accomplished his primary mission (attack the batteships) and did not want to risk his fleet in case the US carriers showed up. This was typical behavior of Japanese officers during the war: sticking to their mission and not be willing to take any chances.
– Barry
5 hours ago
@Barry, on the other hand all that accomplishes is make WWII bloodier. December 7 was a total loss for the Japanese. Even if they neutralize Hawaii altogether they will be crushed by overwhelming power.
– Joshua
5 hours ago
add a comment |
1
The attack started at about 8 AM and both waves were over by about 10 AM. Thus there was plenty of time to carry out a third wave. I have read that the Japanese pilots wanted a third wave because they had seen other targets (fuel storage tanks, drydocks, submarine pens, etc.) but that Nagumo refused because he felt he accomplished his primary mission (attack the batteships) and did not want to risk his fleet in case the US carriers showed up. This was typical behavior of Japanese officers during the war: sticking to their mission and not be willing to take any chances.
– Barry
5 hours ago
@Barry, on the other hand all that accomplishes is make WWII bloodier. December 7 was a total loss for the Japanese. Even if they neutralize Hawaii altogether they will be crushed by overwhelming power.
– Joshua
5 hours ago
1
1
The attack started at about 8 AM and both waves were over by about 10 AM. Thus there was plenty of time to carry out a third wave. I have read that the Japanese pilots wanted a third wave because they had seen other targets (fuel storage tanks, drydocks, submarine pens, etc.) but that Nagumo refused because he felt he accomplished his primary mission (attack the batteships) and did not want to risk his fleet in case the US carriers showed up. This was typical behavior of Japanese officers during the war: sticking to their mission and not be willing to take any chances.
– Barry
5 hours ago
The attack started at about 8 AM and both waves were over by about 10 AM. Thus there was plenty of time to carry out a third wave. I have read that the Japanese pilots wanted a third wave because they had seen other targets (fuel storage tanks, drydocks, submarine pens, etc.) but that Nagumo refused because he felt he accomplished his primary mission (attack the batteships) and did not want to risk his fleet in case the US carriers showed up. This was typical behavior of Japanese officers during the war: sticking to their mission and not be willing to take any chances.
– Barry
5 hours ago
@Barry, on the other hand all that accomplishes is make WWII bloodier. December 7 was a total loss for the Japanese. Even if they neutralize Hawaii altogether they will be crushed by overwhelming power.
– Joshua
5 hours ago
@Barry, on the other hand all that accomplishes is make WWII bloodier. December 7 was a total loss for the Japanese. Even if they neutralize Hawaii altogether they will be crushed by overwhelming power.
– Joshua
5 hours ago
add a comment |
kmccarty is a new contributor. Be nice, and check out our Code of Conduct.
kmccarty is a new contributor. Be nice, and check out our Code of Conduct.
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I believe this topic has been explored extensively if sometimes inarticulately at alternatehistory.com. I believe the general consensus there to have been lack of capacity to inflict strategic damage while preserving a force in being.
– Samuel Russell
1 hour ago